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With one significant exception – public 
funding – Australia’s approach to political 
finance has been decidedly laissez-faire 
(see Orr, 2010; Tham, 2010). This is clear 
by comparison with New Zealand, Canada 
and the United Kingdom. Australia and 
New Zealand may be separated by just 
2,000 kilometres of the Tasman Sea but, in 
regulatory terms, New Zealand lies close 
to Britain and Australia lies closer to the 
United States.
That said, Australia might be catching 
up on international developments. For 
the past couple of years, concerns with 
accountability, corruptibility and the cost 
of electoral politics have driven several 
inquiries and elicited cross-party support 
for significant reform. There is some 
bipartisan support for both contribution 
and expenditure limits. The trajectory of 
Australian debate is thus towards more 
regulation, at a time when New Zealand 
is turning the other way, particularly 
as regards third parties. At the time of 
writing, however (May 2010), Australia is 
yet to see any comprehensive reform bills. 
Introduction
This article compares some key aspects of political finance 
regulation in Australia and New Zealand. It centres on public 
money and electioneering expenditure. These are treated in 
three sections: expenditure limits; incumbency benefits, such 
as government advertising and parliamentary entitlements; 
and direct public funding of electioneering. A comparison 
paper by Joo-Cheong Tham explores private money in 
politics, in particular donations and their disclosure.
Expenditure limits
New Zealand has, for some time imposed 
limits on election year expenditure. Only 
in the last two years has Australia begun to 
seriously consider capping expenditure. 
The only jurisdiction in Australia that 
caps campaign expenditure currently is 
Tasmania’s upper house (in practice a 
cap on candidate spending, as the house 
is the only Westminster-style chamber to 
remain dominated by independents).
The belated emergence of interest in 
expenditure caps in Australia is born of 
a widespread and multi-partisan feeling 
that Australian political finance needs 
significant reform. The feeling is strongest 
in New South Wales, where local and 
state-level corruption and undue donor 
influence are particularly pronounced. 
In March a multi-party committee 
recommended:
• capping expenditure by parties 
and candidates, the party cap to be 
based on seats contested. The cap 
might apply from the beginning of 
each election year. In comparison, 
New Zealand is proposing to reduce 
its regulated period to a maximum of 
90 days prior to the poll.
• capping third-party expenditure, 
at a figure ‘significantly lower’ than 
the party cap. In comparison, New 
Zealand is abolishing its cap on third-
party or ‘parallel’ campaigns. (NSW 
Parliament, 2010, recommendations 
19–22)
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The New South Wales committee did 
not suggest a figure for the expenditure 
caps, or define their scope except to give 
two principles:
• electioneering, but not administration 
costs, should be covered;
• public funding levels, government 
advertising and third-party activities 
should be taken into account.
The New South Wales Electoral 
Commission stuck out its neck and 
proposed more detail, in particular that 
third-party, or lobby, groups be capped at 
the equivalent of NZ$260,000 per election 
year, with only New South Wales electors 
or New South Wales organisations being 
entitled to electioneer.
These caps were proposed in tandem 
with a tight annual limit on donations, 
of about NZ$2,600 per annum from any 
elector to any party or its candidates. 
Corporations and organisations would 
not be permitted to donate; but they 
could (a) join parties or (b) affiliate, 
like trade unions, but with their fees 
corralled for administrative and not 
electioneering purposes. The committee 
recommended increasing public funding 
to compensate, but opposed any move to 
‘full public funding’ (NSW Parliament, 
2010, recommendations 28–29).
The recommendations were heavily 
influenced by the Canadian system, 
discussed by Colin Feasby in this issue. 
Attention to New Zealand experience 
was less apparent. Whilst the sensitivity 
of restricting third-party restrictions was 
acknowledged in a recommendation 
for wide-ranging consultation prior to 
legislative drafting, the New South Wales 
committee nonetheless recommended 
consideration of mandatory registration, 
auditing and disclosure for third-party 
campaigns. In contrast, having repealed 
the Election Finance Act 2007 as too heavy-
handed, the New Zealand Cabinet decided 
to favour ‘lighter touch’ regulation of third-
party (or ‘parallel campaigner’) campaigns 
(New Zealand Cabinet, 2009, p.2). Under 
its Electoral (Finance Reform and Advance 
Voting) Bill, electioneering campaigns 
of over NZ$12,000 would still require 
registration. Unlike parties and candidates, 
however, third parties will no longer face 
expenditure caps, let alone an obligation 
to submit expenditure or donation returns 
(New Zealand Cabinet, 2009).
Nor has Australia confronted the 
question of what to include in an 
expenditure cap. At present, Australian 
definitions of ‘electoral matter’ or 
‘political expenditure’ are quite broad. 
They cover anything ‘intended or 
likely to affect voting in an election’, 
or ‘the public expression of views on 
an issue in an election’.1 But these were 
designed to trigger disclosure of the 
authors and funders of political speech. 
Narrower definitions may be required 
for restrictions on expenditure on – and 
hence the quantum of – such speech. 
Indeed, even the 2007 Act sought to avoid 
capturing pure issue advertising in its net 
(Geddis, 2008, pp.220-1). Of course, the 
distinction between issue advertising and 
advertising promoting or denigrating a 
particular party is a slippery one. It may 
be cleaner to simply bite the bullet and 
restrict all political campaigning during 
the election period.
Designing expenditure caps in 
Australia will be bedevilled by two 
factors. One is constitutional. The 
High Court, in the ACTV case in 1992,2 
discovered an implied freedom of 
political communication. At the suit 
of a television company, it used that 
implied freedom to strike down a United 
Kingdom/New Zealand-style system of 
banning campaign broadcasts in favour 
of free air-time. Expenditure limits 
need not be unconstitutional, however, 
provided they are proportionate to 
legitimate ends such as electoral equality 
and political integrity.
A second complication, which 
New Zealand legislators do not face, 
is Australia’s federal system. It is one 
thing for a state or national parliament 
to legislate caps, but political issues and 
money are fluid and cross-jurisdictional. 
Legislators can force their parties to keep 
separate campaign accounts, but once 
regulation extends beyond the narrow 
and formal election campaign period the 
problem of regulating political money in 
a federation becomes more complex, and 
ideally requires uniform laws.
Incumbency benefits: parliamentary 
allowances and government advertising
Parliamentary entitlements are numer-
ous, intricate,3 and subject to perennial 
tinkering. Concern in Australia lies chiefly 
in two types: electorate allowances, and 
printing and communication allowances. 
Electorate allowances of between 
NZ$40,000 and $60,000pa are paid 
without strings attached. Federal MPs can 
use them to top up their base salary and 
defray expenses. Or, like salary, they are 
free to plough them into electioneering. 
There are calls for separate accounting of 
electorate allowances and to ensure that 
they are not used for electioneering.4
Other, non-salary allowances are 
sizeable: amounting to about NZ$210.6m 
in 2008–09 (or just over NZ$930,000 
per federal MP). Of these, printing and 
communication entitlements permit 
MPs to address their electorates through 
direct mail and newsletters. There has 
been an ongoing tug of war over their 
quantum and use. Formerly uncapped, 
these allowances drew the ire of the 
auditor-general in 2001. A choice example 
of the problem involved Bob Horne, a 
Labor MHR in a marginal seat, spending 
about NZ$284,000 on printing allowance 
alone, six times the average of other MPs. 
Dubbed ‘Bob-the-Printer’, he still lost his 
seat (Tham and Young, 2006, p.55).
Notoriously, in 2005 the New Zealand auditor-general 
identified ‘widespread’ electioneering abuses of MP 
support, leadership and party funds. All but one party 
was implicated, and over NZ$1.17m was involved.  
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The Howard government sub-
sequently introduced caps. But these were 
generous in size and scope. The printing 
allowance still exceeded NZ$195,000 per 
annum in 2006.5 Close to half could be 
squirrelled away and rolled over, say into 
an election year, and special ministers of 
state ruled that it could be used for pure 
electioneering in the form of how-to-
vote and postal vote material. Unlike in 
New Zealand, there has not even been an 
explicit rule against such moneys being 
used for ‘electioneering’. Unsurprisingly, 
the auditor-general recently found 
that nearly three-quarters of MPs’ 
communications were likely to be outside 
the notional purpose of ‘constituency 
service’ (Auditor-General for Australia, 
2009–10, p.17).
This is not to say that New Zealand has 
had best practice. Notoriously, in 2005 the 
New Zealand auditor-general identified 
‘widespread’ electioneering abuses 
of MP support, leadership and party 
funds. All but one party was implicated, 
and over NZ$1.17m was involved. The 
Parliamentary Service Act 2000 definition 
currently only forbids parliamentary 
funds being used to explicitly seek voter 
support. This creates a loophole for both 
negative and issue advertising using 
parliamentary entitlements. The Electoral 
Act 1993 definition of ‘election advertising’, 
capping private expenditure, is broader. 
The New Zealand Cabinet has endorsed 
a proposal to harmonise the definitions 
by adopting the broader definition for 
parliamentary material, but only during 
the regulated election campaign period 
(New Zealand Cabinet, 2009, appendix 2). 
This restriction is only a partial solution. 
Yet it is tighter than anything yet proposed 
in Australia. Australia in many regards is 
in catch-up mode with New Zealand. It 
took until mid-2009 to adopt the New 
Zealand practice of pre-screening MPs’ 
material.
In both countries, the department 
overseeing parliamentary entitlements 
(New Zealand Parliamentary Services and 
the Australian Department of Finance) 
has faced criticism for a lack of rigorous 
scrutiny.6 Parliamentarians argue that 
they act in good faith, on conventional 
beliefs about proper usage. In other 
words, everyone makes hay when the 
system lacks clear rules and accountability. 
The convention is one of a double effect: 
electoral benefit is fine, provided it is 
incidental to material that is otherwise 
directed to constituency business. But in 
Australia particularly, the convention is 
belied around election time by a ‘surge’ 
in use of allowances leading up to each 
election; and by leaflets that mirror party 
(especially attack) advertising.7 Rules have 
even had to be devised to prevent MPs 
in safe seats – and senators who do little 
personal campaigning – from using their 
allowances to prop up other campaigns. 
While New Zealand lacks an upper house, 
a similar problem must arise if party-
list MP allowances are used in a targeted 
way to assist colleagues in marginal 
constituencies.
An Australian special minister of 
state independent committee is due to 
report on parliamentary entitlements. 
This should build on decisions made in 
mid-2009 to rein in crasser aspects of 
system – by confining printing allowances 
to ‘parliamentary or electorate business’ 
and not ‘party business or electioneering’, 
including capping postal vote applications 
to 50% of the electorate and not allowing 
incumbents to print how-to-vote material 
with parliamentary funds. The problem, 
as with government advertising, is how 
to restrain incumbency benefit without 
strangling legitimate information and 
communication. Government advertising 
is the bigger concern in Australia, 
however, for two reasons (Orr, 2006). 
One is the sheer size of the campaigns: 
the High Court effectively ruled that the 
size is up to the executive and campaigns 
can even promote government bills prior 
to parliamentary consideration.8 Around 
NZ$195m was spent on media costs alone 
for the WorkChoices industrial relations 
campaign, in which the conservative 
government dramatically outbid its 
trade union opponents. The other is 
that government advertising benefits 
only the governing party.9 (Governments 
already benefit from a lion’s share of 
corporate donations, especially under an 
uncapped donations system, since big 
donations tend to favour the party in 
power (at least until the writing is on the 
wall – see McMenamin, 2008).) At least 
parliamentary entitlements are capped 
and spread across all parliamentary 
parties.
A repeated refrain about both govern-
ment advertising and parliamentary 
entitlements in Australia is the absence 
of principles-based legislation defining 
and restricting their use. Instead, loose 
guidelines and bureaucratic discretion 
govern both types of expenditure. Any 
real oversight is falling, periodically and 
post-hoc, to the auditor-general. Since 
2007, for instance, the Australian auditor-
general has been involved in both vetting 
government advertising campaigns prior 
to their approval and auditing select 
campaigns after the event (Hawke, 2010). 
Yet that vetting role is being taken away.
Public electoral funding
Since the early 1980s, Australia has had 
public funding of elections.10 Federal 
parties receive money for votes received, 
paid in a lump sum after each election. 
Each vote, in 2010, will be worth about 
NZ$3, or NZ$6 per elector given the twin 
House and Senate ballots. Small parties 
[Australian] Federal parties receive money for votes 
received, paid in a lump sum after each election. Each 
vote, in 2010, will be worth about NZ$3, or NZ$6 per 
elector given the twin House and Senate ballots. Small 
parties miss out in races where they don’t meet a 4% 
threshold. 
Page 24 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 6, Issue 3 – August 2010
miss out in races where they don’t meet a 
4% threshold. The payments come without 
strings attached, and although they rarely 
cover the full cost of electioneering in an 
uncapped ‘arms race’ they are predictable 
and significant. The 2007 Australian 
election generated the equivalent of about 
$NZ60m in public funding. In contrast, the 
2008 New Zealand electoral broadcasting 
allocation (the only direct electioneering 
funding) was just $NZ3.2m.
New Zealand – like the United 
Kingdom – lacks either a neat or a 
developed approach to public funding. 
There may be good reasons for this, 
such as the belief that parties are private 
associations, not quasi-state actors. This 
belief has two pragmatic manifestations. 
There is a fear that public funding might 
incite taxpayer cynicism, and a longer-
term concern that parties might lose sight 
of their grassroots.
Certainly, party membership is 
parlous in Australia, but that trend is 
common internationally. But unrestrained 
corporate donations are the greatest 
danger to parties’ responsiveness to their 
bases. Any taxpayer opposition to public 
funding appears to be short-term, and 
counterbalanced by the fact that the 
money comes without strings attached.
The New Zealand Royal Commission 
on the Electoral System recommended 
Australian-style public funding. Its benefit 
is its simplicity. A single payment is 
made per electoral cycle, and democratic 
principle underlies paying per vote 
received. The 4% threshold may need 
lowering to take MMP into account. Whilst 
parties can use the funding for whatever 
purpose they wish, the effect is electoral 
reimbursement. Such public funding 
explicitly recognises that electioneering is 
a public necessity or good, and accepts that 
elections are party-centred. It bypasses the 
problem with parliamentary entitlements 
of separating legitimate from illegitimate 
types of communication and advertising. 
But that problem is far from 
eliminated. Public funding, far from 
being a magic bullet, has not restrained 
demand for political money in Australia. 
On the contrary, the arms-race in the 
absence of expenditure limits has created 
a ‘have your cake and eat it too’ mentality. 
Generous parliamentary allowances were 
misused and needlessly expanded. The 
current Labor government’s more chaste 
approach to government advertising and 
printing allowances has helped. But such 
tempering is likely to be temporary, unless 
legislation is introduced to reinforce it.
Conclusion
A common lament is that we get the 
best democracy money can buy. That 
is cynical, given there is no guaranteed, 
let alone linear, relationship between 
money spent and political outcomes. Even 
large-scale political expenditure can be 
of little avail: witness the WorkChoices 
government advertising and the fate of 
‘Bob the Printer’. Nonetheless, all else 
being equal, money matters. And the 
more the merrier: no political campaign 
would prefer fewer resources to more. 
As politics becomes even more leader-
centred, it is now common for new leaders 
to be introduced with an advertising blitz 
– an example of the ‘permanent campaign’ 
where parties spend money on a daily 
basis on confidential market research. 
In the United States, a perennial 
problem is the size of the war chests needed 
to unseat an incumbent. This contributes 
to a sense that politics is closed to all but 
insiders and the individually wealthy 
and well-connected. Perversely, the old 
mechanism to wrestle power away from 
insiders in the form of party bosses – the 
primary election – only magnifies the war-
chest problem. 
In Westminster systems the war-chest 
problem may be less acute, but only by 
a matter of degree. It is also manifested 
differently. Unlike in the United States, the 
problem is not one of candidate finances, 
but party finances. And the problem is 
not just of private money leveraging and 
entrenching power, but also of public 
moneys reinforcing incumbency.
Australian politicians currently appear 
keen on increasing public funding and 
limiting donations, two measures not on 
the New Zealand radar. Cynics will note 
that enthusiasm for this has coincided 
with a decline in corporate donations 
during the global financial crisis; but 
a general weariness with fund-raising 
and carpet-bagging predates that crisis. 
While Australian campaign finance law 
has been less interventionist than in its 
common law-cousins, when Australia 
regulates it tends to do so with a statist 
bias. In particular, parties will have little 
stomach for imposing expenditure caps 
on themselves but not third parties. 
Libertarians in New Zealand would look 
askance at this approach: third-party 
expenditure caps in Australia could indeed 
be dangerous without governments 
accepting real restrictions on government 
advertising, especially in election years.
In the meantime, public funding is 
the only area where Australian practice 
is more developed than New Zealand’s. 
Direct public funding to defray election 
expenses may be a cleaner and more honest 
method than what Geddis has labelled 
‘backdoor’ support through a convoluted 
set of parliamentary service funds 
(Geddis, 2008, p.218). However, Australian 
experience shows that tight, even legislated 
controls and vetting of materials is needed 
to prevent MPs misusing parliamentary 
allowances for partisan purposes. In this 
... [the] Australian experience shows that tight, even 
legislated controls and vetting of materials is needed 
to prevent MPs misusing parliamentary allowances 
for partisan purposes. In this and other egalitarian 
measures ... Australia lags behind New Zealand in 
retaining a laissez-faire bias. 
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and other egalitarian measures – notably 
capping party expenditures – Australia lags 
behind New Zealand in retaining a laissez-
faire bias. That libertarian bias is eroding, 
however, and there is momentum, across 
the Australian spectrum, for stronger 
regulation, possibly on the Canadian 
model of limiting donations and 
expenditures. Australians are considering 
this trajectory at the same time as New 
Zealand is pulling back from its high point 
of interventionism, under the short-lived 
Election Finance Act 2007. 
1 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, s4 (‘electoral matter’), 
s314AEB (‘political expenditure’).
2 Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992), 177 
CLR 106.
3 Recently described as ‘difficult to understand and manage’ 
and ‘complex and overdue for reform’: see Auditor-General 
for Australia, 2009–10, pp.15, 17.
4 For example, former Senator Murray’s submission to the 
Committee for the Review of Parliamentary entitlements, 
p.11, http://www.finance.gov.au/parliamentary-services.docs/
Mr_Andrew_Murray.pdf.
5 Australian MPs currently serve electorates with over twice 
the enrolment of those represented by New Zealand 
constituency MPs.
6 The Australian auditor-general described the Department 
of Finance as adopting ‘a relatively gentle approach to 
entitlements administration’ (Auditor-General for Australia, 
2009–10, p.16).
7 The Australian auditor-general shows expenditure increasing 
from two to five times in election years over non-election 
years, as war chests are squirrelled away then spent. 
(Auditor-General for Australia, 2009–10, p.30; appendix 4.)
8 Combet v Commonwealth (2005), 221 ALR 621.
9 This need not necessarily be the case. Queensland now 
allows the Opposition leader to access funds for policy 
advertising (Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2002, 
section 4.5).
10 First for New South Wales elections (1981), then national 
elections (1983). Four smaller jurisdictions still lack public 
funding (Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania and 
the Northern Territory).
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